Forging a Person’s Signature Constitutes “Means of Identification”

The 11^th Circuit recently affirmed the conviction and sentencing of Freddie Wilson. Wilson was a bondsman that expanded his business to check cashing, and was convicted on all 14 counts of his indictment, ranging from aggravated identity theft to obstruction. The evidence against him was substantial, as the .pdf will show in the background covering pages 2 through 12.

In his appeal, Wilson claimed that “the use of the victims’ names on the … checks … is not sufficient to identify a specific individual.” The 11^th disagreed. Since Wilson had not presented this issue to the district court, the circuit only reviewed for plain error and found none. However, since the 4^th and 9^th Circuits had conflicted on the issue in the past, the 11^th addressed the merits of the argument. They found that the plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A resolved the issue, and went on to quote the 9^th Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Blixt that “[b]y using the word ‘any’ to qualify the term ‘name,’ the statute reflects Congress’s intention to construct an expansive definition” that includes a signature.” To conclude this portion of the discussion, the 11^th found: “Here, the United States Treasury checks were made payable to six individuals and were endorsed with those individuals’ forged signatures. This evidence was sufficient to constitute a “ means of identification ” to identify a specific individual under the statute.” The discussion of this topic is pages 16 through 19 of the .pdf.

Pages 12 through 16 discuss Wilson’s contention that the evidence was insufficient. The Circuit found that the evidence against him was “ample.” Pages 20 through 22 address that the evidence presented at trial was not a variation from the allegations in the indictment. Again, Wilson did not present the issue during the trial, and as such the Circuit Court only reviewed it for plain error, finding none. The Court discusses Wilson’s contention that significant amounts of evidence should have been inadmissible on pages 22 through 32. Finally, the last four pages of the .pdf cover the details of his sentencing on the 14 counts, and finds no errors.